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Abstract. Analysis of contracts and contractual relations are among the most topical issues 
in modern management theories and practices. This paper incorporates the interdisciplinary 
New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, 
Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) and suggests a holistic framework for 
analysis of contracts in farming and agri-business sector. First, it specifies type and 
importance of different mechanisms of governance of agrarian and agri-business activity. 
Second, it defines the essence, and classifies types and features of agrarian and agri-
business contracts. Next, it identifies technological, institutional, behavioral, dimensional, 
and transaction costs factors for contractual choice, and specifies effective modes for 
contractual arrangements in agriculture and agri-business. Finally, it determines the 
effective boundaries and sustainability of farming and agri-business organizations. 
Keywords. Contract management, Type of agrarian contracts, Factor and efficiency of 
contractual choice, Economic boundaries and sustainability of farm. 
JEL. Q10, Q56, R33. 
 
1. Introduction 
ost part of farmers and agri-business relations are governed though 
various type of contracts (Bachev, 2004; 2010). For instance, when 
chemicals or fuel are purchased on market a spotlight contract is used, 
indicating an acceptance to acquire a particular good for a certain price against 
agent’s obligation for at spot payment. When a labor is hired an employment 
contract is applied stipulating negotiated terms on how labor will be used, 
conditions and terms of work, modes of payment etc. In marketing of farm produce 
long-term contracts with wholesales, processors, and food-chains are frequently 
used specifying quantities, qualities, time of deliveries, prices etc. When a farmer 
sets up or joins a cooperative (firm) he signs accepting the terms of organization’s 
constitutive contract with members’ rights and obligations. Similarly, when a 
farmer joins a public funding, training etc. program he agrees to get a public 
contract for services, subsidies etc. for free or against some commitments - e.g. to 
use funding purposely, provide environmental protection services etc.   
Forms and factors of agrarian contracts have been intensively studied during the 
last twenty five years around the world (Bachev & Tsuji, 2001; Eswaran & Kotwal, 
1985; Guo, Jolly & Zhu, 2007; James, Klein & Sykuta, 2007; Hayami & Otsuka, 
1993; Little & Watts, 1994; Sykuta, 2008; Sporleder, 1992; Swain, 2009; Wilson, 
1986). A considerable progress has been made I understanding the economic logic 
and efficiency of contractual choice, “make or buy decision”, sharecropping and 
employment arrangements, vertically integrated forms, industry and countries 
specificities etc. Most studies focus on a particular type contract (land tenure, 
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employment), a specific functional area of farming activity (land or labor supply, 
marketing), a certain factor of contractual choice (agency or transaction costs, 
agents opportunism) etc. At the same time, a little attention is put on importance 
and combination of institutional, behavioral, economic, technological, ecological 
etc. factors of contractual choice as well as on comparative efficiency, 
interdependency and complementarities of different governance arrangements.   
In this paper we incorporate the interdisciplinary New Institutional and 
Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, 
Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences) and suggest a holistic framework for 
analysis of agrarian and agri-business contracts. First, we specify type and 
importance of different mechanisms of governance of agrarian and agri-business 
activity. Second, we define the essence, and classify types and features of agrarian 
and agri-business contracts. Next, we identify technological, institutional, 
behavioral, dimensional, and transaction costs factors for contractual choice, and 
specify effective modes for contractual arrangements in agriculture and agri-
business. Finally, we determine the effective boundaries and sustainability of 
farming and agibusiness organizations. 
 
2. Mechanisms of governance of agrarian and agri-business 
activity 
In modern society resources, activities and interactions of individual agents are 
governed by a number of distinct mechanisms (Figure 1).  
First, institutional environment or the “rules of the game”– that is the 
distribution of rights and obligations between individuals, groups, communities, 
and generations, and the system(s) of enforcement of these rights and rules 
(Furuboth & Richter, 1998; North, 1990). The spectrum of rights could embrace 
the material assets, natural resources, intangibles, certain activities, labor safety, 
clean environment, food security, intra- and inter-generational justice etc. A part of 
the rights and rules are constituted by the formal laws, regulations, standards, court 
decisions etc. In addition, there are important informal rules and rights determined 
by the tradition, culture, religion, ideology, ethical and moral norms etc. The 
enforcement of various rights and rules is done by the state (administration, court, 
police) or other mechanisms such as community pressure, trust, reputation, private 
modes, self-enforcement etc.  
 
 
Figure 1. Mechanisms of governance of agrarian and agri-business activity 
 
Institutions and institutional modernization create dissimilar incentives, 
restrictions and costs for intensifying exchange, increasing productivity, inducing 
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private and collective initiatives, developing new rights, decreasing divergence 
between social groups and regions, responding to ecological and other challenges. 
For example, (socially, legally) acceptable norms for use of labor, plant, livestock, 
and environmental resources; employment of certain forms of contracts or 
organizations; trade with particular resources and products etc., all they could 
differ even between various regions of the same country.  
The institutional “development” is initiated by the public authority, 
international actions (agreements, assistance, pressure), and the private and 
collective actions of individuals. It is associated with the modernization and/or 
redistribution of the existing rights; and the evolution of new rights and the 
emergence of novel (private, public, hybrid) institutions for their enforcement. 
Specific institutional environment is a key parameter which eventually determines 
the potential for and the particular type of development in different communities, 
regions, and countries (North, 1990). 
In the modern society a great deal of individuals’ activities and relations are 
regulated and sanctioned by some (general, specific) formal and informal 
institutions. However, there is no perfect system of preset outside rules that can 
govern effectively the entire activities of individuals in all possible (and quite 
specific) circumstances of their life and relations. Principally individual agent finds 
out (can not easily change) the institutional environment and frequently there is not 
a voluntary (“contractual”) choice - agent is to follow socially imposed rules of the 
game otherwise risks to be punished. 
Second,“invisible hand of free market” (market price movements, market 
competition) which importance for the coordination (direction, correction) and 
stimulation of economic activities, exchanges and allocation of resources is among 
fundamentals of political economy for more than 200 years. Individual agents use 
(adapt to) markets profiting from specialization and mutually beneficial exchange 
(trade) while their voluntary decentralized actions govern overall distribution of 
efforts and resources between activities, sectors, regions, countries.  
Generally, individual agents can not affect the price level (“price taking”) but 
are free to accept or not (a voluntary contract) whether to use certain markets, 
counterparts, prices etc. and take associate costs and risks. However, there are also 
instances of lack of individual choices and unwanted exchanges (contracts) - e.g. 
missing markets, monopoly and power relations, externalities etc. Consequently, 
free market “fails” to govern effectively the entire activity, exchanges, and 
resources of individuals.  
Third, private modes (“private or collective ordering”) – those are diverse 
private or collectively designed special contractual and organizational 
arrangements governing bilateral or multilateral relations between private agents. 
Individuals take advantage of institutional, market etc. opportunities and deal with 
institutional and market deficiency by selecting or designing mutually beneficial 
private modes (rules) for governing of their relations and exchanges. Private mode 
negotiates own rules or accepts existing private (collective) order, transfers 
existing rights or gives new rights to counterpart(s), and safeguards absolute 
(assigned by institutions) and/or contracted rights. In most cases private 
governance is based on voluntary and mutually beneficial contracts. However, 
there are instances of unwanted private or collective order (contract) cased by a 
monopoly or a power situation of some private agents or organizations.   
In modern society a great part of agrarian activity is governed by private 
negotiations, “visible hand of the manager”, or collective decision-making. 
Nevertheless, there are many examples of “private sector deficiency and failures” 
in governing of socially desirable activity such as environmental preservation, food 
security etc.  
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Forth, public intervention (“public order”) – these are various forms of a third-
party public (Government, community, international) involvement in market and 
private sectors such as public guidance, public regulation, public taxation, public 
assistance, public funding, public provision, property right modernization etc. 
Public modes are both mandatory and voluntary (e.g. public contract) for all or 
qualified private agents. 
The role of public (local, national and transnational) governance has been 
increasing along with the intensification of activity and exchange, and the growing 
interdependence of social, economic and environmental activities. In many cases, 
the effective organization of certain activity through a market mechanism and/or a 
private negotiation would take a long period of time, be very costly, could not 
reach a socially desirable scale, or be impossible at all. Thus a centralized public 
intervention could achieve the willing state of the system faster, cheaper or more 
efficiently
1
. Nonetheless, there are a great number of bad public involvements 
(inaction, wrong intervention, over-regulation) leading to significant problems of 
sustainable development around the globe. 
Fifth, hybrid forms – some mixture combining features of market and/or private 
and/or public governance. 
“Governance matters” and depending on the (efficiency of) system of 
governance “put in place”, the outcome of the development is quite different with 
diverse levels of socio-economic progression and environmental conservation 
(Figure 1). Subsequently there has been quite unlike results of agrarian transition 
of different industries and countries around the world (Bachev, 2010). 
 
3. Essence and type of agrarian and agri-business contracts 
The contract is a mean for voluntary exchange of rights and obligations 
between two or more parties by which they govern their relations in mutual benefit. 
The rights that agents give and receive could be on human capital, natural 
resources, material and financial assets, liabilities etc. The subject of contract are 
rights agents really posses as right of ownership, rights of management, user rights, 
rights to generate income etc. Rights can be transferred entirely (sale) or partially 
(hiring, lease). The exchange can occur instantly in the present (e.g. a cow for cash) 
or in some moment or period of time in the future after contracting (sale of future 
yield, land lease, employment of labor etc.). The later opens up possibility some of 
the parties to “steal” rights (non-fulfillment of promises) transferred with a contract 
(Furuboth & Richter, 1998). 
Initial distribution of rights and obligations between agents in society is done by 
the laws and regulations, tradition, moral, religion and ethical norms etc. In modern 
society a great part of relations between agrarian agents are regulated (governed) 
by laws and formals norms. For instance, it is not allowed to trade farm products 
not meeting formal standards for quality and safety; subject of sale could be only 
the right to use labor but not the personality of the worker
2
; employment of 
children is forbidden; marketing of certain products is to be done at fixed prices or 
by certified organizations etc.  
Preset outside rules and restrictions (should) facilitate relations of economic 
agents. However, they can hardly regulate all their aspects in the specific 
conditions of individual agents. The contract is the mean by which individual 
agents optimize relations creating private rules of exchange (of owned private 
 
1  At current stage (“globalization”) many of the challenges facing economical and agrarian 
development (food security, effective management of environmental resources, fight against 
diseases, climate change,) requite trans-border or even global governance. 
2 Slavary is prohibited around the world but still practiced in some countries. 
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rights) adapted to their specific conditions and needs (Williamson, 1996). The only 
formal (institutional) restriction is that private contract must not contradict laws 
and harm interests of third parties. Furthermore, there are widespread informal 
(unwritten) contracts which enforcement through formal (e.g. court) system is 
difficult or impossible
3
. 
There is a big variety of contractual relations in which agrarian agents 
participate or may take part in. Particular type of contracts have different specific 
characteristics – specific subject, formal requirements, possibility for an effective 
transfer and protection of various rights, costs for preparation, enforcement, 
disputing, and termination of contractual terms. “The rational” agrarian agents take 
into account the potential benefits, advantages and shortcomings of divers 
contractual forms when chose modes for governing of their relations with other 
agents.  
A particular attention is put on assessment of possibilities for opportunistic 
behavior of counterparts and inclusion of special contractual terms for safeguard 
against it. Tendency for opportunism means that if there is an opportunity for a 
party to get non-punishably an extra rent from exchange (performing unwanted 
exchange by others) the agent will likely “steal” the rights of others (Williamson, 
1996). 
Agrarian contracts can be classified in some of the following major categories: 
- Sale-purchase contract - that type of contract arranges a permanent transfer 
of rights on particular resource or object against payment of a certain price. The 
major risk for buying farmer is from pre-contractual opportunism of seller. The 
buyer usually does not have full information for the quality of acquired object, and 
seller is not interested in revealing the existing shortcomings. For instance, when a 
second-hand tractor is purchased it is difficult to evaluate whether the technical 
state correspond to the claims of seller (problems appear later on during 
exploitation); real yield of a new seed variety is discovered in cropping time etc. In 
order to safeguard against these risks a preliminary testing, a trying period before 
final purchase, giving a guarantee by seller etc. are negotiated. 
There is also possibility for post-contractual opportunism if a long-term asset 
(e.g. equipment) combined with after-sale technical service (e.g. maintenance, 
upgrading etc.) is purchased. Since the trade is completed (money transferred) the 
promise for future servicing is not fulfilled or it is executed badly or with delays. 
The opportunistic behavior of seller decreases (self-restricted) when a long-term 
contract is employed or there is a high likelihood for new contracts between 
counterparts in future. 
On the other hand, farmer as a seller often faces post-contractual opportunism in 
terms of delayed payment or non-payment for marketed farm output. In order to 
protect from this risk a safeguard term (e.g. advance payment, cash payment, cash 
and carry) is applied or interlink deals is contracted (crediting and/or inputs supply 
by buyer against marketing of farm produce). In any case, risk diminishes 
considerably when farmer chooses a seller/buyer to whom he trusts or selects 
market agents with built a good reputation. 
- Lease contract - this type of contract arranges the transfer of right on a 
temporary use of certain resource or object against payment of a rent. Major risks 
for farmers here are from pre-contractual opportunism associated with the quality 
of leased item (similar to a purchase contract) and from employment of a fix rent. 
For instance, when a fix rent is contracted the tenant takes the entire risk of losses 
(or benefits) from the variation of productivity and income of leased resource 
 
3  Nevertheless they are quite effective and broadly applied in agrarian sector of transitional, 
developing and developed countries alike. 
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(object, land, animal). That sort of risk could be shared with the owner through 
contracting a share rent or even entirely eliminated through applying a market rent. 
The lease contract also gives possibility for pre- and post-contractual 
opportunism from the lease-holder. In the former case, the tenant does not declare 
his intention to use ineffectively leased resource (object) while in the later case he 
is practicing such behavior (bad maintenance of leased building and equipment, 
poor care of leased animals, improper crop rotation, insufficient compensation of 
nutrition intakes through fertilization, pirate sharing or trade of new variety seeds, 
software or technology). Moreover, it is common a delayed or non-payment of 
contracted rent by tenants. 
- Employment contract - this contract arranges the right to receive a particular 
service from hired for a certain period of time labor against payment of salary or 
wage by the employer. Special feature of this “service” contract is that the one 
party (the employer) acquires the right to direct, control and fire another side – 
thus there is a relation of subordination. This mode gives possibilities for rapid 
adaptation to current labor needs of farm. Alternatively either is has to be prepared 
a very detailed service contract (with relevant rights and obligations of partners in 
all possible contingencies during the period of their relationship) or to permanently 
(re)negotiate new contracts along with changing conditions and needs of each 
partner. 
Major risks for farmers associated with this type of contract are from pre- and 
post-contractual opportunism. In the first case, the applicant-worker could 
misinform for his capabilities or intentions in order to get the job. Farmers can 
protect asking recommendations, selecting candidates with certain education level 
or training certificate, organizing interview and/or test for determining the 
applicant’s ability etc. In the second case, hired worker may not put the necessary 
(contracted) efforts after receiving the job. The later is facilitating by the fact, that 
in agriculture permanent supervision of labor is impossible and/or productivity is 
not always proportional to the labor input (e.g. positive or negative impact of 
climate factor). Besides, a highly qualified worker may leave the job in a critical 
for the farm moment (e.g. combine operator during harvesting time) because of 
offered a higher salary by the competitor farm.  
In order to restrict these forms of opportunism farmers apply: a permanent 
employment contract, appointment of team-leaders (supervisors), output-based 
compensation, payment of bonuses, give incentives for improving productivity 
through labor participation in farm management, rights for pay holidays, providing 
free services, housing etc.   
- Service contract – this type of contract arranges the right to receive a certain 
service against payment of a price. The service could be material (cultivation of 
land, plant protection, transportation, advertisement, software, water and electricity 
supply) or for accomplishing a particular task (maintenance of equipment, 
veterinary service, agronomic advice, education, guarding, garbage collection).  
Unlike employment contract here both sides are in equal position (rather than of 
subordination). In many instances, the farmer is not even able to “direct” service 
provider as it is with medical treatment, education, consulting, guarding etc. 
Frequently it could be utilize an output-based payment which significantly restricts 
the opportunism of service supplier. Nevertheless, often the employment of a time-
based or fixed payment is the only possible option. Principally a long-term supply 
contract improves the quality of provided service – getting familiar with a 
particular farm (land parcels, equipments, animals), desire to keep or renew the 
contract etc. In any case, selection of a supplier with a good reputation diminishes 
the risk from opportunistic behavior.  
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Nevertheless, there are widespread instances of a (semi)monopoly situation 
when farmers have to accept the terms and the modes of implementation of a 
service contract –in electricity and water supply, garbage collection, public (e.g. 
extension, information) and administration services etc.  
- Loan contract – this type of contract arranges a temporary transfer of 
property right on some amount of money (money loan) or product (loan in kind) 
against payment or not of a certain price (interest). Unlike lease contract the 
debtor is not obliged to return the identical money/product which is borrowed, but 
just the same quantity of borrowed assets (usually with some interest above the 
loan).  
In modern conditions most common is the contract for money loan from a 
commercial bank, private individual or entity, or public agency. The control over 
utilization of the loan by the creditor is very difficult because of the high 
“mobility” of money. In order to avoid the opportunism of debtor a strict selection 
of applicants is practiced by crediting agent (studying out credit history, reputation, 
papers of property ownership; requirement for guarantors), and a significant 
collateral, guarantee and/or coo-financing is requested. All these considerably 
increase the cost of (or entirely block) using that type of contract by farmers.  
On the other hand, farmers often face a pre-contractual opportunism of 
creditors taking advantage of their (“monopoly” or power) position and employing 
unfavorable for farmers terms and/or not informing borrowers about the “hidden” 
costs associated with the loan contract. 
Increasingly other more-efficient forms for giving loan are applied in package 
with sale of long-term assets (leasing), short-term assets (in installments or delayed 
payments), or interlinked credit against marketing of farm output or services. 
- Insurance contract – this contract arranges the transfer of particular risk-
taking during a period of time against payment of a certain price. When event 
(incident) covered by the insurance contract occurs, the insurer pays an insurance 
premium according to negotiated terms. Assurance is offered (sold) against various 
risks - damages on property, yield, animals and persons caused by natural (hail, 
frost, storm, flood, fire), health (injury, disease, dead) or social factors 
(destruction, theft). 
Usually, opportunism may occur by insured person before signing the contract 
(not disclosing the real information for possible risks) or during contract execution 
period (not taking actions for reducing damages when event occurs; consciously 
provoking damages in order to get insurance premium etc.). That augments 
considerably the insurance prices and restricts utilization of insurance contracts by 
farmers. 
On the other hand, farmers often “discover” the pre-contractual opportunism of 
insurers only after the occurrence of harmful event. Then they find out that not all 
assurance terms (protected risks, extend of coverage of damages, ways of 
assessment of damages, payments etc.) had not been well explained and/or adapted 
to farmers needs before signing the contract.  
For many kind of farm related risks markets evolve very slowly and/or 
insurance services are practically inaccessible by majority of farmers. What is 
more, for many important risks insurance is not available for purchase at all – e.g. 
risk of lack of market demand of farm products, fluctuation of prices of farm 
produce, possible opportunism of counterparts in contractual relations etc. That is 
why farmers have to develop other (private, collective) modes to safeguard their 
investments and rights or lobby for a public intervention in assurance supply 
(Bachev & Nanseki, 2008). 
- Coalition contract – this type of contract regulates rights and obligations in 
coalition of actions and/or resources of two or more agents. Members of the 
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coalition exchange certain rights associated with the ownership, control and 
direction of particular resources, management of the coalition, distribution of 
income and other benefits of the activity, coalition period, ways of expansion of the 
coalition and termination of membership etc.  
According to the specific goals it may be established different type of coalitions 
– informal partnerships (coalition of resources and/or activity), cooperatives (non-
for profit), firms (profit-making), associations (collective actions) etc.  
In coalition contract most often there is a risk of post-contractual opportunism, 
when some member(s) does not fulfill obligations to the coalition or uses 
improperly the organization in their own private interest. In order to avoid that risk 
partners with a high mutual confidence are selected (family members, relatives, 
friends), and the membership of collation is restricted (mutual control on 
opportunism is practically possible). In coalition with open membership 
(cooperative, corporation) effective mechanisms are put in place to motivate 
members (preferences for working members of coalition) and secure direct 
members participation in the management and control of the coalition. 
In a very big open membership coalition it is possible a particular pre- and post-
contractual opportunism as well. Creation and development of such coalition is 
associated with significant costs (for initiation, establishment, registration, 
organizational modernization) while the efficiency and sustainability of the new 
form is uncertain. That is why there are no incentives for individuals to participate 
in that process and make the necessary investments of efforts and means. However, 
in case of a successful organization, the willingness to join and benefit (“free-
riding”) from new the coalition greatly increases. 
In the real agrarian economy there is a great variety of contractual arrangements 
designed to fit the needs of counterparts – natural, pure, complex, interlinked, 
complementary, bilateral, trilateral, multilateral etc. forms. For instance, in the 
traditional (non-cash) agrarian economy natural exchanges are typical – goods, 
resources and services are traded against other goods, resources and services 
(barters, gifts); loans, interests, wages, rents and membership fees are paid in kind 
etc. Furthermore, in the modern economy there are wide spreading more complex 
and interlinked contracts arranging: inputs (service) supply and crediting, inputs 
(service) supply and/against marketing of farm output, acquiring a share in the 
property (cooperative, partnership) against servicing, crediting and marketing etc.    
 
4. Factors for choice of contract form 
In rare cases there is only one practically possible form for governing of 
agrarian activity. For instance, a natural minimal size of farm organization is 
determined by a technological parameter such as non-separability of activities (e.g. 
a biological nonseparability of individual animal). Also in Japanese dispersed 
paddy agriculture water supply could not have been conducted by individual 
farmers (high interdependency, nonseparability of water use) and since earliest 
period water use organization developed as public projects (Mori, 1991). Effective 
governance of some environmental activities requires a certain scale and thus 
collective actions at local, regional, national or transnational scale (Bachev, 2009). 
Nevertheless, beside few examples, in farming is almost impossible to find cases 
where the choice of form of governance is unilaterally determined by technological 
parameters. 
Another technological factor which could define the mode of governance (e.g. 
farm size) is possibilities to explore technological economy of scale and scope. For 
instance, in order to use a large combine capacity a farmer increases operational 
size; or he produces two or more products under different technologies in order to 
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use “free” resources (e.g. available family labor). Nevertheless, development of 
technology usually follows demand and in fact is a changeable parameter as well
4
. 
Moreover maximum economy of scale can be reached not through internalizing 
activity but by market exchange with a specialized activity - e.g. selling or buying 
harvesting service. Free farm resources could also be traded (sell, lease out) more 
effectively in market place instead of using them in own non-specialized activities 
(opportunity costs reason).  
In fact there is an opposite tendency in the real agrarian economy - dependence 
of technological development from the governance structure. It is common when 
institutional restrictions (for land transfer, hiring labor etc) and high level of 
transaction costs (e.g. for outside credit supply) prevent exploration of the potential 
of available technologies. Domination of primitive technologies is a rule rather 
than an exception in the farming sector of transitional and developing countries. In 
other instances, high transaction uncertainty or imperfect institutional arrangements 
extend farming organization far beyond “technologically optimal” size. For 
instance, it has been typical “over-concentration” of East-European agriculture 
during communist era, and “over-integration and over-cooperation” in transitional 
period thereafter (Bachev, 2006). 
Often the choice of governing mode is pre-determined by institutional 
restrictions as some forms for carrying out farming activities, land and labor 
supply, trade of output etc. could be socially unacceptable or illegal in certain 
countries or period of time. For instance, corporate and cooperative organization of 
farming is forbidden in many countries; market trade of farmland, natural 
resources, and some outputs (inputs) is illegitimate, private management of natural 
ecosystems (parks, reserve zones) is not allowed etc.  Nevertheless, when costs 
associated with the illegitimate governance is not high (possibility for disclosure 
low, enforcement and punishment insignificant) while benefits are considerable, 
then the more effective modes prevail – large gray or black sectors of economy are 
common around the globe. 
Principally, the choice of contractual form will greatly depend on the efficiency 
of (outside) institutional environment – regulation, stability and enforcement of 
property rights; extend of direction of private relations, possibility for rapid and 
costless dispute resolution, efficiency of punishment of offenders etc. For instance, 
in conditions of well-working public system of regulations (quality standards, price 
guarantees) and laws and contract enforcement a preference will be given to 
spotlight and classical (standard) contracts. On the other hand, if rights on major 
agrarian resources are not defined or not well defined, and absolute and contracted 
right effectively enforced (as was the case during most of the post communist 
transition) that lead to domination of primitive subsistence farming, informal, 
personal and over-integrated forms, unsustainable organizations, undeveloped and 
missing markets etc. 
Usually, every agrarian activity and exchange could be governed through a 
great variety of alterative forms. For instance, cultivation of land by a tractor can 
be governed in different ways: a farmer can buy (unified ownership), rent (rent 
contract) or lease a tractor (input and credit supply interlinked contract); farmer 
could buy cultivation service from market (contract service); number of farmers 
may buy a tractor (joint ownership) and use it in a group (producers cooperative) or 
individually; farmer can join a cooperative providing cultivation services (non for 
profit organization); farmers may lease land out to a tractor owner and share output 
(share tenancy contract); farmer can hire a tractorist to work on farm (employment 
 
4  Otherwise it is very difficult to explain widespread distribution of small scale machinery in 
agriculture. 
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contract), and may even sell out cultivation service to market (profit making 
organization); cultivation service to farms could be subsidized by Government 
(trilateral mode), or provided by a municipality or state company (public 
organization). 
One extreme for the farm manager is to specialize exclusively in governing of 
market transactions rather than production management
5
. For example, leasing-in 
farmland and long-term material assets, purchasing all services for cultivation and 
harvesting of output, buying needed short-term material assets, selling all primary 
products on market. Another extreme is a close internal organization such as one-
person or group subsistent farm - farmer(s) employ only own resources (land, 
labor, technological knowledge) and consume the entire product. Between these 
two polls there is a spectrum of feasible modes for governing of agrarian activity 
and exchange: various sort long-term contracts, association, cooperation, 
interlinked organization, hybrid forms, farms of different type (partnerships, 
corporations, complex hierarchies) etc. 
The different governance modes are alternative but not equally efficient modes 
for organization of activities. Each of them has distinct advantages and 
disadvantages to protect individuals rights and investments, coordinate and 
stimulate activities, explore economies of scale and scope, save production and 
governance costs etc.  
The free market has a big coordination and incentive advantages (“invisible 
hand of market”, “power of competition”), and provides “unlimited” opportunities 
to benefit from specialization and exchange. However, market governance could be 
associated with a high uncertainty, risk, and costs due to price instability, great 
possibility for facing an opportunistic behavior, “missing market” situation etc.  
The special contract form (“private ordering”) permits a better coordination, 
intensification, and safeguard of activity. However, it may require large costs for 
specification of contract provisions, adjustments with constant changes in 
conditions, enforcement and disputing of negotiated terms etc.  
The internal (ownership) organization allows a greater flexibility and control 
on activity (direct coordination, adaptation, enforcement, and dispute resolution by 
a fiat). However, extension of internal mode beyond family and small-partnership 
boundaries (allowing achieving the minimum technological or agronomic 
requirements; exploration of technological economies of scale and scope) may 
command significant costs for development (initiation and design, formal 
registration, restructuring), and for current management (collective decision 
making, control on coalition members opportunism, supervision and motivation of 
hired labor etc.). 
Separation of ownership from management (cooperative, corporation, public 
firm/farm) gives enormous opportunities for growth in productivity and transacting 
efficiency – internal division and specialization of labor; exploration of economies 
of scale and scope; introduction of innovation; diversification; risk sharing; 
investing in product promotion, brand names, relations with customers, 
counterparts and authorities. However, it could be connected with huge transaction 
costs for decreasing information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders, decision-making, controlling opportunism, and adaptation. The 
cooperative and non-for profit form also suffers from low capability for internal 
long-term investment due to non-for-profit goals and non-tradable character of 
shares (so called “horizon problem”). 
 
5 That is not a hypothetical case – “contract farming” is quite popular in Japan where many part-time 
“farmers” contract out most or all of major paddy operations to professional (specialized) farms. 
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The choice of contractual form also depends on personal characteristics of 
individual agents – preferences, knowledge, capability, experience, risk-aversion, 
reputation, trust, “contract” power etc. For instance, farming organization is often 
restricted to a family partnership. Moreover, if farmer is a good manager he will be 
able to design, control and implement more efficient form adapted to his specific 
needs (e.g. effective management of more contracts for outside supply with 
specialized services and/or inputs). Similarly, high risk-taking farmer will prefer 
more risky but productive contractual forms (e.g. extension of farms through bank 
credit for a new profitable venture). Likewise, when counterparts are family 
members (close friends) there is no need for complex contracts since relations are 
easily “governed” by the good will and mutual interests of parties. 
Finally, the choice of governing mode depends on transaction costs. 
Governance is usually associated with significant costs for protection, contracting 
and exchange of individual rights. For example, farmers have costs for finding best 
prices and partners; negotiating conditions of exchange; contract writing and 
registration; enforcing negotiated terms through monitoring, controlling, measuring 
and safeguarding; disputing through a court system or another way; adjusting or 
termination along with evolving conditions of exchange etc.  
Therefore, rational agents will seek, chose, and develop such modes for 
governing their activity and exchanges which maximize transacting benefits and 
minimize transaction costs. Moreover, both (current) transaction costs for using 
governing forms and long-term transaction costs for development (initiation, 
modernization, liquidation) of governance mode are taken into account.  
If transaction costs were zero then the mode of the governance would not be of 
economic importance (Williamson, 1996). In such a world individuals would 
manage their relations with an equal efficiency though free market, or through 
private organizations of different types, or in a single nationwide company. All 
information for the effective potential of transactions (exploration of technological 
opportunities, satisfying various demands, respecting assigned and transferred 
rights) would be costlessly available. And the individuals would costlessly define 
new rights, and protect their (absolute and contracted) rights, and trade owned 
resources (and products) in mutual benefit until exhausting the possibilities for 
increasing productivity (situation known as “Pareto optimum/efficiency”).  
Thus the type of governance becomes crucial since various modes give unequal 
possibilities for participants to coordinate activities, and stimulate an acceptable 
behavior of others (counterparts, dependents), and protect their contracted and 
absolute rights from unwanted expropriation. Nevertheless, often the high costs 
make it difficult or block otherwise efficient (mutually beneficial) transactions. For 
instance, despite the great pay-off of investments in agrarian research and 
innovation, market and private agents do not organize such activity because of their 
high uncertainty and low market and private appropriability (Bachev & Labonne, 
2000). There is a strong need for a “third-party” (Government, NGOs, international 
assistance etc.) intervention in order to make such activity more effective or 
possible at all.  
If there is a market and private sector failure but an effective government 
intervention is not introduced in a due time the agrarian “development” is 
substantially deformed (Government failure is possible). In Bulgaria for instance, 
there has been a great number of bad examples for Government under- and over-
interventions in agrarian sector. Consequently, primitive and uncompetitive small-
scale farming; predominance of over-integrated and personalized exchanges; 
ineffective and corrupted agrarian bureaucracy; blocking out of all class of agrarian 
transactions (such as innovation and extension supply, long-term credit supply, 
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supply of infrastructure and environmental goods); and development of large 
informal (gray) sector, all they have come out as a result (Bachev, 2007).  
In the long term only effective governing structures for the specific economic, 
institutional and natural environment and personal characteristics of agents will 
dominate in agriculture (Bachev, 2004). Thus there will be no singe (universal) 
mode for effective organization of all type of agrarian activity and exchange in any 
possible natural, institutional, and economic surroundings. In any particular 
moment of time agrarian activities will be carried out (governed) through a great 
variety of modes: some will be governed by “invisible hand of market”, other will 
be carried out through a special contract mode, some will be managed within 
hierarchy, some will be supported by a third party, some would require more 
complicated and mixed modes.  
 
5. Effective forms for contractual choice  
In addition to production costs, the agrarian agents make significant transaction 
costs for governing relations with other agents - individuals, private entities, public 
authorities
6
.  
The institutional environment considerably affects the level of transaction costs 
of individual agents. For instance, when private rights are well defined and 
protected, and (public) system for contract enforcement work well - that facilitates 
transactions between individuals and the effective allocation of resources. 
(Development of) institutional environment also imposes significant transaction 
costs to agents – e.g. for studying out and complying with various institutional 
restrictions (community or state norms, regulations, standards), formal registration 
of contracts and entities, efforts to deal with bureaucracy etc. A good example in 
this respect are current problems of many Bulgarian farms to meet the new EU 
requirements (“institutionally determined” costs) related to new product quality, 
food safety, labor, environmental, animal welfare etc. standards (Bachev, 2008). 
Furthermore, EC is increasingly criticized for imposing unnecessary regulations 
(and related costs for agrarian agents) for the size, shape and color of vegetables 
and fruits for trade in EU etc. 
Transaction costs have two behavioral origins: individual’s bounded rationality 
and tendency for opportunism (Williamson, 1996). Economic agents do not possess 
full information about the system (price ranges, trade opportunities, adverse effects 
of their activities on others, trends in development) since the collection and 
processing of such information would be either very expensive or impossible (e.g. 
for future events, for partners intention for cheating, time and space discrepancy 
between individual action and adverse impacts on others etc.). In order to optimize 
decision-making agents have to spent costs for "increasing their imperfect 
rationality" - for data collection, analysis, forecasting, training etc.  
Individuals are also given to opportunism in two major forms: pre-contractual 
("adverse selection") - when some party uses "information asymmetry" to negotiate 
better contract terms; and post-contractual ("moral hazard") - when some 
counterpart takes an advantage of impossibility for full observation on his activities 
(by another partner or by a third party) or when he takes "legal advantages" of 
unpredicted changes in transacting conditions (costs, prices, environment etc.).  
A special third form of opportunism occurs in the development of large 
organizations (known as “free-riding”). Since the individual benefits are often not 
proportional to the individual efforts, everybody tends to expect others to invest 
 
6  Production costs are the cost associated with proper technology (“combination of production 
factors”) of certain farming, servicing, environmental, community development etc. activity. The 
transaction costs are the costs for governing the economic and other relations between individuals. 
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costs for the organizational development and later on to benefit from the successful 
new organization (Olson, 1969).  
Commonly, it is very costly or impossible to distinguish the opportunistic from 
non-opportunistic behavior (because of the bounded rationality). Therefore, 
agrarian agents have to protect their transactions and rights from the hazard of 
opportunism through: ex ante efforts to protect their “absolute” (given by 
dominating institutions) rights, and find a reliable counterpart and to design an 
efficient mode for partners credible commitments to “contracted” (voluntary 
transferred) rights; and ex post investments for overcoming (through monitoring, 
controlling, stimulating cooperation) of possible opportunism during contract 
execution stage. 
Technological development also affects enormously the structure and level of 
transaction costs (North, 1990). For instance, mechanization and standardization of 
farming operations (products) increases bounded rationality of farm manager, and 
diminishes possibility for opportunism of hired labor and counterparts. That leads 
to the extension of activities and transactions under a singe management (the farm 
size) – enlargement of internal transactions (internal division and specialization of 
labor) as well as outside market and/or contract transacting (procurement, trade, 
cooperation etc.).  
Possibilities that progression and application of modern production (e.g. 
precision farming), transportation, measurement, information, communication etc. 
technologies gives to coordinate and intensify transactions and minimize related 
costs are immense - easy assessment and traceability; on line information, 
coordination, monitoring, detecting, advise; direct low costs exchanges (expressing 
demands, finding best prices and partners, negotiating, trading, disputing) and 
collective actions (coalitions) of interested agents at national and international 
scales; rapid detection of problems and interventions by the governments and 
international agencies; full participation of individuals in and control on public 
decision-making etc.  
However, that enormous potential for increasing productivity, effective 
allocation of resources, conservation of environment etc. meets the restrictions of 
imperfect institutional arrangements which eventually slow-sown scientific and 
technological progress, impede individual market and private transactions, allow 
particular agents (bureaucrats, interest groups) to benefits from the status-quos, and 
lead to unsustainable “development”. It is widely recognized that constant “food 
crisis” has been a consequence not of the lack of sufficient (world) technologies 
and resources for food production but the bad governance - inefficient 
Governments, inefficient international organizations, and inefficient global 
governance. 
One direction for evaluation of efficiency of alternative contractual arrangement 
is the direct comparison of costs for each transaction in different forms. 
Organization which requires fewer costs is more efficient - e.g. it is more 
economical to use a marketing cooperative instead of own direct marketing of farm 
output.  
Part of the transaction costs can be easily specified - costs for management, 
licensing and registration, agro-market information, promotion and marketing of 
output, general management, hiring lawyers and court suits, guarding property and 
yields, payment of bribes etc.  
However, a significant portion of transaction costs is either very difficult (too 
expensive) or impossible to be assessed. In that group we can include the costs for 
finding best partners, negotiation, controlling and enforcement of contractual 
terms, organizational development, interlinked transacting, unrealized (failed) deals 
etc. Besides, it is often extremely complicated to separate transaction costs from 
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traditional production expenditures
7
. For example, while executing farming 
operations a farmer supervises hired labor; during transportation of chemicals he 
negotiates marketing of output etc.  
Component comparison of transacting costs could not always give an idea for 
efficiency of organizations. Very often the alternative form decreases one type of 
costs while increasing another type transacting costs – e.g. internalization of a 
transaction (replacement of market with integral mode) is associated with reduction 
of costs for information supply (overcoming market uncertainty), permanent 
(re)negotiations along with constantly changing conditions, safeguarding 
investments from outside opportunism. On the other hand, it enlarges costs for 
organizational formation, decision making, integral management, supervising and 
motivation of hired labor etc. In above example with alternatives for marketing of 
farm output the “internal realization” (personal consumption, production 
“consumption”, processing) could be chosen as more efficient form to direct sell or 
use of marketing cooperative.  
Often it is difficult to select a base for comparison in view that the high 
transacting costs entirely block development of an alternative organization. For 
instance, market for agrarian credit did not emerged in Bulgaria during most of the 
transition and the internal supply (utilization of own finance, direct outside co-
investment) was the only possible form for finance supply of farms (Bachev, 
2006). Here the comparative level of transaction costs is impossible to be 
determined and appreciate the “high” efficiency of integral mode for financing. In 
that case funding with “own means” and with “bank credit” are not real alternative 
but completely different governing arrangements.  
Finally, a good part of transactions in agriculture is governed not by “pure” but 
through complex, interlinked and/or supplementary modes - e.g. inputs supply in a 
“package” with know-how, credit, and/or service supply; crediting of production 
against marketing of output; governing of critical activities within own farm and 
membership cooperative etc. Thus, it is important to take into consideration the 
overall (total) costs for organization of transactions of different types - all external 
and internal transaction costs of the farm. 
Another direction for evaluation of comparative efficiency of alternative 
governing forms is the Discrete structural analysis (Williamson, 1996). Here the 
assessment of absolute levels of transaction costs of alternative governing 
structures is not necessary. This approach aims to evaluate the relative levels of 
transacting costs between alternative modes of governance, and selecting that one 
which most economizes on transacting costs. Actually, farm managers are 
interested not in absolute level of transaction costs in different form, but in 
organization with the lowest comparative costs for a particular transaction.  
First the “critical dimensions” of transactions, responsible for the variation of 
transaction costs, are to be identified. “Frequency”, “uncertainty”, and “asset 
specificity” have been identified as critical factors of the transaction costs by 
Williamson (1996) while the “appropriability” has been added by Bachev & 
Labonne (2000).  
When the recurrence of transactions between the same partners is high, then 
both (all) sides are interested in sustaining and minimizing costs of their relations 
(avoiding opportunism, building reputation, setting up adjustment mechanisms 
etc.). Besides, the costs for development of a special private mode for facilitating 
bilateral (or multilateral) exchange could be effectively recovered by frequent 
exchange.  
 
7 All these “measurement problems” make it impossible to extend the traditional Neoclassical models 
simply by adding a new "transacting" activity (Furuboth & Richter, 1998). 
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When the uncertainty, which surrounds transactions increases, then costs for 
carrying out and secure the transactions go up (for overcoming information 
deficiency, safeguarding against risk etc.). Certain risks could be diminished or 
eliminated by a production management or through a special market mode (e.g. 
purchase of insurance). However, the governance of most transacting risk would 
require a special private forms - e.g. trade with origins; providing guarantees; using 
share-rent or output-based compensation; employing economic hostages; 
participating in a risk-pooling, inputs-supply or marketing cooperative; a complete 
integration (Bachev & Nanseki, 2008).  
The transaction costs get very high when specific assets for the relations with a 
particular partner are to be deployed
8
. In this case it is impossible to change a 
partner of transaction (alternative use of assets) without a big loss in value of the 
specific capital. Relation specific (dependent) investments are "locked" in 
transactions with a particular buyer or seller (personality of partner matters), and 
cannot be recovered through a "faceless" market trade. Costless redeployment 
(alternative use) of specific assets is not possible if transactions fail to occur, they 
are prematurely terminated, or less favorable terms are renegotiated (in contract 
renewal time and before the end of life-span of specific capital). Therefore, 
dependant investment (assets) have to be safeguarded by a special form such as 
long-term or tied-up contract, interlinks, hostage taking, joint investment, quasi or 
complete (ownership) integration. Often, the later is quite expensive, investment in 
specific capital are not made, and activity either can not take place or occurs 
without (or loss of) comparative advantages in respect of productivity 
If symmetrical assets dependency (regime of bilateral trade) exists there are 
strong incentives in both parties to elaborate a special private mode of governance. 
However, when unilateral dependency exists then dependent side (facing mini or 
total monopoly) has to protect investments against possible opportunism 
(behavioral uncertainty) either through integrating transactions (unified 
organization, joint ownership, cooperative)
9
; or safeguarding them with interlinked 
contract, exchange of economic hostages, development of collective organization 
to outstand asymmetrical dependency (for price negotiation, lobbying for 
Government regulations) etc. 
The transacting is particularly difficult when appropriability of rights on 
products, services or resources is low. "Natural" low appropriability has most of 
the agrarian intellectual products - agro-market information, agro-meteorological 
forecasts, new varieties and technologies, software etc. Besides, all products and 
activities with significant (positive or negative) externalities are to be included in 
this group. If the appropriability is low the possibility for unwanted (market or 
private) exchange is great, and the costs for protection (safeguard, detection of 
cheating, disputing) of private rights and investments extremely high. Agents 
would either over produce (negative externalities) or under organize such activity 
(positive externalities) unless they are governed by an efficient private or hybrid 
mode (cooperation, strategic alliances, long-term contract, trade secrets, or public 
order).  
Second, we have to “align transactions (differing in their attributes) with the 
governance structures (differing in their costs and competence) in discriminating 
 
8 Specificity is not a technological but transacting characteristic of assets. In one situation a particular 
capital (investment) could be highly universal (easy deployment to another internal usage or outside 
trade) while in others - highly specific (a big dependency from the relations with a certain 
counterpart (buyer, seller, coalition partner). 
9 When technological opportunities for economy on scale (scope) on specific assets can be achieved. 
Otherwise integration of transactions will be lost-making comparing to outside price (production 
costs) competition. 
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(mainly in transaction cost economizing) way” (Williamson, 1996). According to 
the combination of the specific characteristics of each activity and transaction, 
there will be different the most effective form for governance o that particular 
activity (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
Generic modes 
Critical dimensions of transactions 
Appropriability 
                                  High Low 
Assets Specificity  
          Low           High 
Uncertainty 
       Low       High       Low       High 
Frequency 
High  Low High   Low  High   Low  High   Low 
Free market          
Special contract form          
Internal organization          
Third-party involvement          
Public intervention          
   - the most effective mode;  - a necessity for a third party involvement 
Figure 2. Effective modes for contractual arrangement in agriculture and agri-business
10
 
 
Agrarian transactions with a good appropriability, high certainty, and universal 
character of investments (the partner can be changed anytime without significant 
additional costs) could be effectively carried across free market through spotlight 
or classical contracts. Here the organization of transactions with a special form or 
within the farm (firm) would only bring extra costs without producing any 
transacting benefits.  
Recurrent transactions with low assets specificity, and a high uncertainty and 
appropriability, could be effectively governed through a special contract. The 
relational (”neoclassical”) contract is applied when detailed terms of transacting 
are not known at outset (a high uncertainty), and a framework (mutual 
expectations) rather than a specification of obligations is practiced. Partners 
(self)restrict from opportunism and are motivated to settle emerging difficulties and 
continue relations (situation of a frequent bilateral trade). Besides, no significant 
risk is involved since investments could be easily (costlessly) redeployed to 
another use or users (no assets dependency exist).  
A special contract forms is also efficient for rare transactions with a low 
uncertainty, high specificity and appropriability. Dependent investment could be 
successfully safeguarded through contract provisions since it is easy to define and 
enforce relevant obligations of partners in all possible contingencies (no 
uncertainty surrounds transactions)
11
. Here the occasional character of transactions 
does not justify internalization within the farm (firm).   
Transactions with a high frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity 
(dependency), and appropriability, have to be organized within the farm/firm 
(internal ownership mode). For instance, managerial and technological knowledge 
is quite specific to a farm, and its supply has to be always governed through a 
permanent labor contract and coupled with ownership rights (Bachev, 2004). 
Capital investments in land are to be made on owned (or long-leased) rather than a 
seasonally rented land (high site and product specificity). All “critical” to the farm 
 
10 Differences in personal characteristics of agents are disregarded. Only extreme levels (high-low) of 
the critical factors are considered. In the real agrarian economy there is a big variation of critical 
dimensions, and thus of the effective governing forms (including mixed, hybrid, interlinked etc. 
governance). 
11 Practically it is difficult (costly) or impossible to write a complete contract for complex transaction 
(Williamson, 1996). 
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material assets will be internally organized - production of forage for animals; 
important machineries; water supply for the irrigated farming etc. While universal 
capital could be effectively financed by a market form (e.g. a bank credit), the 
highly specific investments can be only made through an internal funding (own 
funds, equity sell, joint venture).  
If the specific and specialized capital cannot be effectively organized within the 
farm (economy of scale and scope explored, funding made)
12
, then an effective 
governing form outside farm-gates is to be used - group farming, joint ownership, 
interlinks, cooperative, lobbying for a public intervention.  
When a strong assets (capacity, technology, time of delivery, site, branding) 
inter-dependency with an upstream or downstream partner exists, then it is not 
difficult to govern transactions through a contract mode (strong mutual interests for 
cooperation and restriction of opportunism). For instance, effective supply 
(procurement) contracts between farmers processors are widely used in dairy, meat, 
vine, organic industries (symmetrical dependency). 
However, very often farmers face unilateral dependency and need an effective 
(ownership) organization to protect their interests. Transacting costs for initiation 
and maintaining of such “collective organization” is usually great (big number of 
coalition, different interests of members, opportunism of “free-riding” type) and it 
is either unsustainable or does not evolve at all. That creates serious problems for 
the efficiency (and sustainability) of individual farms - missing markets, monopoly 
or quasi-monopoly situation, impossibility to “induce” a public intervention etc.  
Serious transacting problems arise when condition of assets specificity is 
combined with a high uncertainty, low frequency, and good appropriability. Here 
the elaboration of a special governing structure for a private transacting is not 
justified, specific investments are not made, and activity (restriction of activity) 
fails to occur at an effective scale ("market failure" and "contract failure"). Similar 
difficulties are also encountered for rare transacting associated with a high 
uncertainty and appropriability.  
In all these cases, a third part (private agent, NGO, public authority) 
involvement in transactions is necessary (through assistance, arbitration, 
regulation) in order to make them more efficient or possible at all. Emergence and 
unprecedented development of organic farming, and systems of trade with origins 
and “fair-trade” are good examples in that respect. There is an increasing 
consumer’s demand (a price premium) for organic, original, and fair-trade products 
in many countries. Nevertheless their supply could not be met unless effective 
trilateral governance (including an independent certification and control) has been 
put in place. 
When appropriability associated with a transaction (activity) is low, there is no 
pure market mode to protect and carry out activity effectively. Nevertheless, 
respecting others rights (unwanted exchange avoided) or “granting out” additional 
rights to others (needed transactions carried) could be governed by a “good will” or 
charity actions of individuals, NGOs, government or international organizations.  
For instance, a great number of voluntary environmental initiatives 
(agreements) have emerged driven by the competition in the food industries, 
farmers’ preferences for eco-production, and responds to the public pressure for a 
sound environmental management. Unprecedented development of “codes of 
behaviors”, eco-labeling and branding, environmental cooperatives, and “green 
alliances”, all they are good examples in that respect. Nevertheless, environmental 
standards are usually “process-based”, and “environmental audit” is not conducted 
 
12 Integration of transactions would either increase management costs (needs to buy from or sell to a 
competitor) or it would be loss-making comparing to outside production costs (price) competition. 
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by an independent party, which does not guarantee a “performance outcome”. 
Therefore, most of these initiatives are seeing as a tool for an external image 
manipulation. Recent huge food safety, animal safety, and eco-scandals have 
demonstrated that such private schemes could often fail (result of high bounded 
rationality and possibility for opportunism).  
In any case, voluntary initiatives could hardly satisfy the entire social demand 
especially if they require significant costs. Some private modes could be employed 
if a high frequency (a pay-back on investment is possible) and a mutual assets 
dependency (thus an incentive to cooperate) exists. For example, inter-dependency 
between a dairy farm and a milk processor in a remote region (capacity and site 
dependency); or a bee keeper and a neighboring orchard farm (symmetric 
dependency between needs of flower and needs for pollination).  In all these 
instances, unwritten accords, interlinking, bilateral or collective agreements, close-
membership cooperatives, codes of professional behavior, alliances, internal 
organization etc. are used.  
However, emerging of special (private) large-members organizations for 
dealing with low appropriability (and satisfying the entire “social” demand) would 
be very slow and expensive, and they unlikely be sustainable in a long run (“free 
riding” problem). Therefore, there is a strong need for a third-party public 
(Government, local authority, international assistance etc.) intervention in order to 
make such activity possible or more effective (Bachev, 2004).  
For example, supply of environmental goods by farmers could hardly be 
governed through private contracts with individual consumers because of low 
appropriability, high uncertainty, and rare character of transacting (high costs for 
negotiating, contracting, charging all potential consumers, disputing). At the same 
time, the supply of additional environmental protection service is very costly (in 
terms of production and organization costs) and would unlikely be carried out on a 
voluntary basis. Besides, the financial compensation (price-premium) of farmers by 
willing consumers through a pure market mode is also ineffective due to the high 
information asymmetry, massive enforcement costs etc. A third-party mode with a 
direct public involvement would make that transaction effective: on behalf of the 
consumers the State agency negotiates with individual farmers a public contract for 
“environment conservation and improvement service”, coordinates activities of 
various agents (including a direct production management), provides public 
payments for compensation of farmers, and controls implementation of negotiated 
terms.  
 
 6. Economic boundaries of farming and agri-business 
organizations 
Analysis of efficiency and factors of agrarian contracts let better understand and 
determine the effective size (boundaries) of farms and other agrarian organizations 
for the specific institutional, economic and natural environment of a particular 
industry, country etc. In the traditional (Neoclassical) framework, the farm is 
presented as a “production structure” and analyses of efficiency are restricted to 
production costs (“factors productivity”, “optimization of technological factors 
according to marginal rule”). However, the traditional approach fails the explain: 
why there exist so many farms with different productivity of resources utilization
13
, 
and why there is so big variety of agrarian organizations at all (one-person farms, 
 
13 For instance, production costs productivity of Bulgarian cooperatives has been 5 times lower than 
in private farms (Bachev, 2006). 
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group farms, cooperatives and firms of different kind, subsistent farms, small and 
large farms etc. 
The modern approach studies farm and other agrarian organizations as a 
governance structures which efficiency depends not only on their capacity to 
minimize on production costs, but also to economize on transaction costs (Bachev, 
2004). 
In a one-person subsistent farm there are no transaction costs (one agent), but 
limited possibility for extension of farm size through investment in specialized 
(and specific) human, material and natural capital, expansion of consumption etc. 
“Internal” opportunities for increasing productivity (through division of labor, 
investments, exploring economy of scale and size, new demand) augments along 
increasing the members of coalition (family or group farm, partnership) and/or 
outside trade of resources and products. The later is associated with additional 
transaction costs for making the coalition (finding complementary and reliable 
partners), increased internal costs for management (coordination, reducing bounded 
rationality, controlling opportunism of coalition members), and for outside market 
or contract trade (employment of labor; land and inputs supply; financing, 
marketing of output).  
Thus the effective boundaries of farms will be determined by the trade-off 
between the additional gain in benefits (productivity, consumption etc.) and the 
transaction costs.  
Furthermore, the high costs of outside exchange make it more profitable to 
carry out division and cooperation of labor (a transaction) within an organization 
(firm, group farm) instead across the market
14
. For instance, a specialized livestock 
farm organizes internally a crop (forage) production activity (hiring additional 
labor and farmland) because of the significant costs and risks for market 
procurement of forage. 
Nevertheless, the internal management of transactions is also associated with 
costs (for directing, stimulating and supervising hired labor; coordination and 
controlling activity of partners) which restricts unlimited expansion of borders of 
an organization
15
. Thus a transaction will be carried in an organization if the costs 
are lower than for governing that transaction across market or in another 
organization (Coase, 1937). Accordingly a farm becomes bigger if integrates the 
governance of more internal and outside transactions. Similarly, the farm becomes 
smaller if ceases previously organized transaction(s) and let them to market or 
another organization(s).  
Moreover, the effective size and economic boundaries of farm will be 
determined through optimization of total benefits and minimization of the total 
(production and transaction) costs (Bachev, 2004). Consequently, the distribution 
of overall (agrarian) activities between different farms and agrarian organizations 
will be determined by the comparative costs (efficiency) for using various 
governing arrangements.  
Transacting modes and acceptable net benefits vary according to individual’s 
preferences, entrepreneurship ability, risk aversion, opportunity costs of owned 
resources etc. Depending on the personality of resource owners and the 
(transacting) costs and benefits of their coalition, different type of farm will be 
preferred - one-person farm (firm), family farm (firm), group farm or partnership 
(firm), cooperative farm, and corporative farms (Bachev, 2004). Expected benefits 
 
14  Fundamental “discovery” that "there are costs of using the price mechanism" (Coase, 1937) 
explained why production can not be carried out without any organization and why there are 
organizations of different type and size in agriculture. 
15 Otherwise all agricultural production could be effectively carried on by one big company.  
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for farmers could range from the monetary or non-monetary income; profit; 
indirect revenue; pleasure of self-employment or family enterprise; enjoyment in 
agricultural activities; desire for involvement in environment, biodiversity, or 
cultural heritage preservation; increased leisure and free time; to other non-
economic benefits
16
. 
In the specific economic, institutional and natural environment (socio-economic 
development, legal framework, support policies, tradition, access to new 
technology, level of transacting costs) various types of farm will have quite 
different effective horizontal and vertical boundaries. For instance, in transitional 
conditions of high market and institutional uncertainty, and inefficient property 
rights and contract enforcement system, most agrarian investments happened to be 
in a regime of high specificity (dependency). As a result (over)integrated modes 
such as low productive subsistent household and group farming, or large 
production cooperatives and agro-companies, have been dominating in most East-
European countries. Alternatively, in more matured economies, where markets are 
developed and institutions stable, the agrarian assets (activity) are with more 
universal character. Therefore, farm borders are greatly determined by the family 
borders, and more market and mixed (contract rather than entirely integrated) 
forms prevail. 
Transaction costs minimizing helps us understand the reason of emergence and 
the efficiency of a great variety of agrarian organizations in the modern world – 
economic boundaries of farms (“make of buy decision”; extend of internal division 
and specialization, and product diversification), divers contractual arrangements 
and type of coalitions (partnerships, firms, cooperatives), economic needs for 
cooperation with competitors (inputs supply, marketing, lobbying etc. associations) 
or vertical (downstream, upstream) counterparts, joint ventures, pace and limits of 
development of agrarian markets etc. What is more, efficiency of a particular 
organization can hardly be assessed without analyzing the efficiency of 
complementary and/or competing organization(s). For instance, “high” efficiency 
of small-scale farms and the producers (inputs supply, marketing) organizations in 
most countries can not be properly evaluated without analyzing their high 
complementarities
17
.   
In order to assess the farm’s efficiency we have to put individual transaction in 
the centre of analysis, and assess the level of associated costs and benefits. Major 
types of transactions of a farm entrepreneur are associated with:  
-    management supply, 
- know-how supply, 
- innovation supply,  
- supply of land and other natural resources,  
- labor supply,  
- inputs supply,  
- service supply,  
- finance supply,  
- insurance supply,  
- marketing of services and products. 
Next, we need to identify alternative forms for organization of different farm 
transactions in the specific market, institutional and natural environment, and 
assess their comparative efficiency. For illustration, the principle modes for 
governing of transactions in major functional areas of Bulgarian farms are 
presented in Figure 3.  
 
16  A “desire for preservation of farm for future generation” has been a major reason for the 
persistence (sustainability) of a great number of part-time farms in Japan 
17 E.g. the high efficiency and sustainability of small scale subsistence and semi-market farms, and 
production cooperatives in transitional Bulgarian agriculture (Bachev, 2006). 
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Comparative efficiency is assessed for the condition of each farm as contractual 
(governance) form providing biggest net benefits is selected. For instance, in order 
to explore technological economies of scale a farmer is considering an expansion 
through application of modern machineries and leasing cheaply available farmland 
(Figure 4). Tree contractual forms for securing needed machineries are feasible
18
 – 
a partnership with another farmer, buying mechanization service from a 
specialized market provider, and a purchase of necessary machineries. While 
alternative forms for machinery supply (inputs and services) are associated with 
the same additional transaction costs, the later mode gives biggest additional 
benefit in terms of growth in productivity and additional income. Nevertheless, the 
considerable transaction costs for outside funding (securing a bank loan) make it 
impossible (inefficient) to select the third form otherwise allowing maximum 
productivity (and farm expansion). 
 
Functional areas Alternative contractual modes 
Market contract  Special contract Special 
organization 
Supply of 
management 
na Employment contract with guaranteed 
minimum salary and output-based 
bonuses 
Cooperation 
Partnership 
Supply of land 
and other natural 
resources 
Purchase 
Short-term lease 
Long-term lease with a fix rent  
Long-term lease with a share rent 
Long-term lease with a market rent 
Cooperation 
Partnership 
 
Labor supply Daily hire 
Seasonal hire 
 
Permanent labor contract with a fix 
remuneration 
Permanent labor contract with result 
based payment 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Supply of short-
term material 
assets 
Purchase with a spotlight 
contract 
Standard contract 
Long-term procurement contract 
Supply contract interlinked with a 
credit supply, service supply, and/or 
marketing of farm produce 
Cooperation 
Supply of long-
term material 
assets 
Purchase with a spotlight 
contract 
Standard contract 
Long-term lease contract 
Contract for purchase interlinked with 
crediting (leasing) and/or services 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Service supply Purchase with a spotlight 
contract 
Standard contract 
Long-term supply contract 
Supply contract interlinked with other 
services, products or crediting 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Innovation and 
know-how supply 
Purchase with spotlight 
contract 
Standard contract 
Free consultation in the 
farm advisory system 
Long-term supply contract 
Supply contract interlinked with supply 
of material assets and/or crediting 
Cooperation 
 
Financing Bank loan 
Loan from an individual 
agent 
Loan from a private 
organization 
Co-investment 
Crediting interlinked with supply of 
material assets and services 
Contract with a public funding program  
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Insurance Purchase of insurance 
Purchase of “assurance 
service” 
Insurance contract interlinked with 
material assets 
Long-term insurance contract 
Cooperation 
Marketing of 
products and 
services 
Retail sale 
Wholesale trade 
Standard contract 
 
Long-term contract for marketing 
Marketing contract interlinked with 
crediting, supply of material assets 
and/or services 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Figure 3. Principle contract forms for functional areas of Bulgarian farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Transaction costs for supply of additional farmland could be ignored because they are insignificant. 
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Criteria Alternative contract forms 
Partnership Service contract Purchase of machinery 
1. Additional benefit (growth in 
productivity and income) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
< 
 
 
 
 
 
< 
 
 
 
 
2. Additional transaction costs 
 
   - for inputs and service supply 
 
 
   - for financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
= 
 
 
 
= 
 
 
 
= 
 
 
 
< 
 
3. Net benefits negative positive negative 
Most effective form  ☺  
Figure 4. Assessment of alternative contract forms for expansion of farming and agri-
business organisation 
 
Generally, the contract with the highest transaction costs (for credit supply in 
the above example) eventually determines (limit) the farm boundaries. A major 
factor restricting farm extension, which is generally identified around the world, is 
the enormous costs for enforcement (monitoring, measuring, controlling) of non-
family labor contracts (Hayami & Otsuka, 1993). That is why an owner-operated 
farm is the most common form for farm organization around the world. On the 
other hand, enormous “credit supply” and “marketing” costs were specified as the 
critical factors limiting farm enlargement in the transitional Bulgarian agriculture 
(Bachev & Kagatsume, 2006). Subsequently, despite favorable natural 
environment, cheap labor and farmland, good tradition, and growing market 
demand, a great part of overall farming activity has been carried out in numerous 
small, semi-market and subsistence farms with primitive technology, productivity 
and eco-standards. 
Finally, we can use our new framework to define the sustainability of different 
farms and agrarian organizations. A farm will be sustainable if it manages all 
transactions in the most economical for the owner(s) way – that is the situation 
when there exist no activity which could be carried out with a net benefit (Bachev 
& Peeters, 2005). If a farm does not govern activity or transactions effectively, it 
will be unsustainable since it experiences high costs and difficulties using 
institutions (possibilities, restrictions) and carrying out activity (transactions) 
comparing to other feasible organization. In that case, there will be strong 
incentives for exploring the existing potential (adapting to a sustainable state) 
through reduction or enlargement of farm size, or via reorganization or liquidation 
of the farm. Thus either alternative farm or non-farm application of resources; or 
farm expansion through an employment of additional resources; or trade instead of 
internal use of owned land and labor; or taking over by (or merger with) another 
farm or organization
19
, will take place. 
Furhtermore, we have to estimate farm’s potential (incentives, ability) for 
adaptation to evolving market, institutional and natural environment through 
effective changes in the governing forms (saving on transacting costs) and 
production structure (exploring technological possibilities for growth in 
productivity) (Bachev & Peeters, 2005). Thus if a farm does not have a potential to 
 
19 In most developed countries, the sustainable development has been associated with disappearance 
of traditional farming organization in major sectors (poultry, beef, pig) which is taken over by or 
integrated into related industries (Martinez, 2002). 
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stay at or adapt to new more sustainable level(s) it would be either liquidated or 
transformed into another type of farm. For instance, if a farm faces enormous 
difficulties meeting institutional opportunities and restrictions (e.g. new quality 
and environmental standards, production quotas); or has serious problems 
supplying managerial capital (as it is in a one-person farm when an aged farmer 
has no successor), or supply of needed farmland (a big demand for non-agricultural 
use of land), or funding activities (insufficient own finance, impossibility to sell 
equity or buy credit), or marketing output (a changing demand for certain products, 
strong competition with the imported products), then it would not be sustainable 
despite high historical or current efficiency. Currently there are numerous 
unsustainable farms in most EU countries, which can hardly adjust to fundamental 
changes in CAP, and associated enhanced competition and new safety, 
environmental, animal welfare etc. standards.  
 
7. Conclusion 
Suggested framework let better understand and assess diverse contractual 
arrangements is modern agriculture. It could help identify driving factors (logic) 
and potential efficiency (limits) of various modes of governance in agriculture. 
However, it does not have only academic importance. It could assist agrarian 
agents in effective contract and organizational design for the specific market, 
institutional and natural environment of their activity and relations.  What is more, 
it could significantly support improvement of public (government, international 
assistance etc.) policies and forms of intervention in agrarian sector. 
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